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Abstract
We propose a novel identification strategy to measure monetary policy in a
structural VAR. It is based exclusively on known past policy shocks, which
are uncovered from high-frequency data, and does not rely on any theoreti-
cal a-priori restrictions. Our empirical analysis for the euro area reveals that
interest rate decisions of the ECB surprised financial markets at least fifteen
times since 1999. This information is used to restrict the sign and magnitude
of the structural residuals of the policy rule equation at these shock dates ac-
cordingly. In spite of its utmost agnostic nature, this approach achieves strong
identification, suggesting that unexpected ECB decisions have an immediate
impact on the short-term money market rate, the narrow money stock, com-
modity prices, consumer prices and the Euro-Dollar exchange rate, and that
real output responds gradually. Our close to assumption-free approach ob-
tains as an outcome what traditional sign restrictions on impulse responses
impose as an assumption.
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1 Introduction
Modeling and estimating the effects of monetary policy has been subject to numer-
ous studies over the last decades. Among the various methodological approaches
employed, structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) have become the predominant
tool to identify the causal effects of monetary policy.
Identification of SVARs can be achieved in several ways. Imposing a triangular
structure by means of a Cholesky decomposition of the error variance-covariance
matrix as in the seminal contribution by Sims (1980) is still a widely used approach.
It assumes a specific monetary policy rule and time lags in the effects of mone-
tary policy. Several innovative strategies have since been developed to relax these
identifying assumptions. They include, among others, so called ‘proxy-VARs’, us-
ing external information based on narrative accounts (Romer and Romer, 1989) or
high-frequency data (Gertler and Karadi, 2015), or, alternatively, imposing widely
accepted sign restrictions on impulse response functions (Uhlig, 2005), or, in addi-
tion, on the structural residuals (Antol´ın-Dı´az and Rubio-Ramı´rez, 2018).1
Drawing on these alternative strands of the literature, the present paper suggests
a novel, utmost agnostic and purely data-based, yet highly informative strategy to
identify SVARs and provides an application to monetary policy using euro area data.
First, our approach builds on the ‘proxy-VAR’ literature in using external, high-
frequency data to identify monetary policy shocks, which we also validate by an
ex-post narrative analysis. But unlike existing studies that employ an instrumen-
tal variable approach based on reduced form residuals, which inevitably introduces
additional noise into the model, we use the external information as an ‘internal in-
strument’ in the terminology of Stock and Watson (2018) by imposing corresponding
identifying restrictions within the VAR.
Second, the approach draws on the strand of the SVAR-literature that employs
commonly accepted sign restrictions. But instead of assuming outcomes of impulse
responses, we remain utmost agnostic in the sense of imposing restrictions merely
on the sign of the structural residuals at known shock dates. This strategy is closely
related to Antol´ın-Dı´az and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2018), who supplement traditional sign
restrictions on impulse responses with sign and magnitude restrictions on structural
residuals, which they infer from narrative accounts. We differ in two important
respects: First, we drop restrictions on impulse responses entirely and achieve iden-
tification solely through sign and magnitude restrictions on structural residuals.
Second, the shocks are recovered from high-frequency data rather than from narra-
tive accounts, which insulates them more credibly from endogeneity issues.
This approach directly addresses the critique of Rudebusch (1998) that residuals
of monetary VARs show little correlation with signals from forward-looking financial
markets: Policy shocks are identified properly by construction; at the same time, the
estimated impulse responses are not (necessarily) in conflict with the assumptions
of the aforementioned, alternative identification strategies.
1See Ramey (2016) for a detailed overview of the literature and alternative identification strategies.
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We argue that our approach combines the virtues of these alternative strands of the
literature and avoids their potential limitations. It ‘objectifies’ the identification of
shocks and minimizes endogeneity concerns by the use of high-frequency data. At
the same time, it ensures that the identified shocks are economically meaningful
by an ex-post narrative analysis. It uses outside, financial markets data as an
internal rather than as an external instrument, thereby avoiding the introduction of
additional noise into the estimation. It uses sign restrictions on structural residuals
at known shock dates and avoids making assumptions on macroeconomic effects of
monetary policy (impulse response functions). Finally, unlike other studies, it links
and reconciles, by construction, the macroeconomic model estimates (of structural
shocks) with financial market information.
In our application for the euro area, policy surprises by the European Central
Bank (ECB) are uncovered from high-frequency financial markets data taken from
Altavilla et al. (2019). Specifically, we use observations on interest rate swaps during
time windows, in which the ECB announces its policy rate decision and this is
arguably the only news affecting markets.
Over the period from 1999 to 2019, we identify fifteen sizable monetary policy
shocks (interest rate surprises) by the ECB, eight of which were restrictive and seven
expansive. In the ex-post narrative analysis of these shocks three chronological
clusters emerge: In the early 2000s the ECB deviated from market expectations to
underpin its independence and its commitment to price stability. A second series of
unforeseen interest rate decisions occurred during the global financial crisis 2008 and
its aftermath. A third series of shocks is associated with the change of presidency
from Jean-Claude Trichet to Mario Draghi in 2011 and mounting disagreements in
the Governing Council.
The proposed identification strategy yields a highly informative measure of mon-
etary policy. Specifically, we find that an unexpectedly restrictive interest rate de-
cision by the ECB leads to an increase of the short-term money market rate, a
decline of the narrow money stock, a decline in commodity and consumer prices,
an appreciation of the Euro against the US-Dollar, and a gradual negative response
of output. Hence, in spite of the minimal, close to assumption-free nature of the
approach, no empirical puzzles emerge.
With regard to the systematic component of monetary policy, our estimates of the
ECB’s policy rule suggest that it responds immediately, i.e., within the same month,
to contemporaneously available data on all variables considered, which appears to
exclude consumer prices. Hence, monetary policy is tightened if output, commodity
prices or the money stock surge, if the US federal funds rate goes up or if the Euro
depreciates against the US-Dollar. The zero result on consumer prices is likely due
to publication lags, i.e., that current information is not available at the time when
monetary policy is set.
A counterfactual exercise completes our empirical investigation. We examine
how interest rates would have evolved, if the ECB had always acted according to
the estimated policy rule, i.e., if no monetary policy shocks had occurred. We find
that during the recession from 2003 to 2004, interest rates could have been lowered
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further and that during the subsequent recovery, they could have been raised earlier.
At the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the policy rate was at the upper
bound of the counterfactual range; the ECB could have lowered it by up to 100 basis
points. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, however, the policy stance was
loose, so that the widely criticized rate hikes in 2011 appear justified. Eventually,
recent negative interest rates are also found to be in line with the estimated monetary
policy rule.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our
identification strategy and reports the results from uncovering monetary shocks in
the euro area using high-frequency data. Section 3 introduces the VAR model,
the data used and the identification and estimation procedure. Section 4 presents
the results for the effects of monetary policy shocks, Section 5 those on systematic
monetary policy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section, we develop the approach to uncover monetary policy shocks in the
context of our overall identification strategy and report the results from its applica-
tion to euro area data over the period from 1999 to 2019.
2.1 A Purely Data-Based Identification Strategy
The approach pursued in the present paper uses information on policy shocks that
are uncovered from high-frequency financial markets data during a monetary policy
announcement window. Existing studies that build identification of monetary policy
on high-frequency information do so via an instrumental variable procedure (e.g.,
Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Caldara and Herbst, 2019). In contrast, we incorporate
the external information as an ‘internal instrument’ in the terminology of Stock and
Watson (2018) by imposing identifying restrictions directly within the VAR.
Moreover, we restrict our attention to a set of significant monetary policy shocks.
In this respect, our strategy is close to the narrative approach pioneered by Romer
and Romer (1989, 1994), which has been widely used in subsequent studies to con-
struct external instruments. While this approach clearly has its virtues, a downside
is that broadly accepted narratives are rare and that broad acceptance does not per
se imply validity, i.e., that the shocks uncovered are in fact exogenous (cf. Shapiro,
1994; Leeper, 1997).2
Antol´ın-Dı´az and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2018) incorporate the narrative information
into their ‘internally identified’ SVAR by supplementing traditional sign restric-
tions on impulse responses with sign and magnitude restrictions on the structural
residuals. Specifically, in their application to US monetary policy, the residual of
the interest rate equation at October 1979—the month, in which the Fed adopted
2Romer and Romer (2004) made progress in controlling for endogenous monetary policy by purging
the narrative series of information contained in real-time central bank forecasts.
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an aggressive anti-inflationary policy (‘Volcker shock’)—is assumed to be predom-
inantly driven by a restrictive monetary policy shock. They find that adding this
narrative information strengthens inference on monetary policy shocks considerably.
Our approach is closely related but differs in two respects. First, we abandon all
sign restrictions on impulse responses and build our identification solely on sign and
magnitude restrictions on the structural residuals. Hence, we do not preclude any
macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. This makes our approach utmost agnostic
with the only remaining assumption being that restrictive monetary policy shocks
are associated with an increase in interest rate expectations, which is essentially
definitional.
Second, we do not use narrative accounts but infer monetary policy shocks from
high-frequency financial markets data during time windows of monetary policy com-
munications. Using intra-day data and observing an immediate response of asset
prices to the announcement of a policy measure facilitates to rule out confound-
ing factors and to establish a causal link among these incidents and, hence, the
occurrence of a policy shock.
Summing up, our identification strategy, which is based on residual sign restric-
tions at known shock dates, proceeds in two steps. First, we uncover dates of interest
rate surprises from high-frequency financial markets data. Second, we estimate and
identify the structural VAR using (only) sign and magnitude restrictions on the
structural residuals associated with these monetary policy shocks. The following
subsection summarizes the results from the first step.
2.2 Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area
The identification of monetary policy shocks by the ECB over the time period from
1999 to 2019 makes use of Altavilla et al. (2019), who collect high-frequency data on
financial market variables before and after monetary policy decisions of the ECB.
They differentiate between two time slots on days of monetary policy decisions, the
first of which ranges from 13:25 to 14:10. The only material event within these three
quarters of an hour is the publication of a press release at 13:45, which includes the
ECB’s decision on its three policy rates without any further comment.3
The second time window matches the duration of the subsequent press conference
from 14:15 to 15:50, during which the interest rate decision is commented by the
President and further information, e.g., on forward guidance or quantitative easing,
is conveyed and the ECB’s assessment of the stance of the economy is communicated.
Given this clear separation in the ECB’s communication policy, a key finding
from a factor analysis by Altavilla et al. (2019) is that financial market responses
during the first time window are solely due to interest rate surprises, whereas re-
sponses during the second time slot are due to surprises related to forward guidance,
the assessment of the economic situation by the ECB, and unconventional monetary
policy.
3Two such exemplary press releases are given in Appendix A1.
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In order to identify monetary policy shocks, we focus on financial market reactions
reflecting changes in interest rate expectations during the first of the two aforemen-
tioned time slots. Specifically, we consider data on changes in overnight index swap
(OIS) rates with maturities of 1 week, 1 month, 3 months and 6 months during the
time frame from 13:25 to 14:10 on days of monetary policy decisions.
As the ECB Governing Council usually meets once a month, this intra-day infor-
mation on the (non-)occurrence of a policy shock is easily transformed into monthly
observations in order to match the frequency at which the variables of our VAR
are observed. In the few months, where more than one meeting took place, the
cumulative change of the swap rates in the respective month is considered.
Figure 1: Monetary Policy Decisions and Financial Markets Reactions
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Black dots: Average of standardized 1-week, 1-month, 3-months and 6-months overnight index
swap rate changes in basis points. Red lines: 1.5 standard deviations.
All four resulting swap rate time series are highly leptokurtic: In 80% − 87% of
the cases, swap rates do not change at all or at most by one basis point, yet the
standard deviation of the series ranges from 1.9 to 2.6 basis points. This means,
first, that most interest rate decisions are anticipated and financial markets hardly
react to the press release; and second, that there were some significant unexpected
decisions, i.e., interest rate surprises. We direct our attention to these events.
In particular, we focus on policy surprises at which financial markets were par-
ticularly startled, when the Governing Council of the ECB conveyed its interest rate
decision to the public. To identify such events, we standardize the time series of
the changes in the four swap rates and consider the average of them at each date.
The resulting synthetic series of average changes is presented in Figure 1 together
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Table 1: Monetary Policy Shocks in the Euro Area, 2002-2019
Date Sign Description
Nov. 7, 2002 + Amid deteriorating economy, ECB does not bow to
politicians’, Fed’s and public’s pleas to cut rates.
Dec. 5, 2002 − Having underpinned its independence, ECB relents
in the face of the economic downturn.
Mar. 6, 2003 + Preceding statements of ECB officials have been
misinterpreted in direction of a larger rate cut.
Jun. 5, 2003 − Markets are doubtful about a significant rate cut,
so the ECB exceeds expectations.
Oct. 8, 2008 − Globally coordinated rate cut; full allotment makes
corridor system essentially a floor system.
Nov. 6, 2008 + ECB does not meet expectations raised by BoE’s
sharp rate cut immediately preceding it.
Dec. 4, 2008 + ECB intensifies monetary easing only cautiously
and again lags behind BoE’s rate cut.
Jan. 15, 2009 − Restoration of pre-crisis corridor range reduces in-
terest rate floor disproportionately.
Mar. 5, 2009 + Similarly to late 2008, ECB fails to meet expecta-
tions raised by preceding BoE rate cut.
Apr. 2, 2009 + The unexpectedly timid rate cut shows ECB’s aver-
sion towards a zero-interest policy.
Oct. 6, 2011 + President Trichet’s last meeting; prior statements
of ECB officials misread in direction of rate cut.
Nov. 3, 2011 − President Draghi’s first meeting; rate cut despite
an essentially unchanged economic environment.
Jul. 5, 2012 − Markets did not expect the deposit facility rate to
be reduced to zero.
Sep. 4, 2014 − Rate cut a month after the ECB said rates would
remain unchanged for an extended period of time.
Dec. 3, 2015 + The ECB Governing Council does not follow Pres-
ident Draghi’s push for a higher rate cut.
with red bands that indicate 1.5 standard deviations, which we use as threshold
for the average change in swap rates to qualify as policy shock.4 This threshold
choice implies that there have been fifteen policy shocks—eight restrictive, seven
expansive—in the period from 2002 to 2019.5 Table 1 gives some narrative back-
4We will consider alternative thresholds in the robustness analysis in Subsection 4.3.
5As Altavilla et al. (2019), we use data from 2002 to 2019, because the sparsity (and, hence,
increased volatility) of quotes between 1999 and 2002 impedes separating noise from true policy
surprises in this period.
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ground information on these monetary policy decisions and Appendix A2 provides
a more detailed description based on ECB material and newspaper articles. In the
next section, we outline how these monetary shocks are used in the identification of
the structural VAR by means of sign and magnitude restrictions on the structural
residuals.
3 VAR Implementation
We conduct our empirical analysis by means of a structural VAR model. Point of
departure is the standard reduced form VAR representation
yt = c+
L∑
i=1
Aiyt−i + ut, (1)
where yt is the K × 1 vector of observations on the endogenous variables in time
period (month) t. The right-hand side includes a K × 1 vector of constants, c, and
i = 1, . . . , L time lags of the vector of endogenous variables, yt−i, with corresponding
K ×K reduced-form parameter matrices Ai. As it is standard in the literature on
monetary VARs with monthly data, we set the lag length of the VAR to L = 12.
Finally, ut is a K × 1 vector of stochastic error terms, which are assumed to be
independently and normally distributed, ut ∼ N (0,V ).
Having set up the standard framework for our analysis, we now turn to a de-
scription of the model specification, i.e., the variables included, the data sources and
the econometric implementation of our identification strategy.
3.1 Variables and Data
The long tradition of modeling US monetary policy has produced a consensus on
a set of variables to be included that is considered rich enough to adequately cap-
ture the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. This set includes real output,
economy-wide prices, commodity prices, non-borrowed reserves, total reserves and
the federal funds rate.
There is no corresponding standard for modeling monetary policy in the euro
area. To make the results (and our identification strategy) comparable with previ-
ous studies and alternative methodological approaches, we follow the US modeling
canon, yet with two modifications: First, we use M1 as a measure of the money
stock.6 Second, we add the US federal funds rate (FFR) as a foreign interest rate
and the nominal Euro-Dollar exchange rate (EUR/USD) to account for euro area
interactions with the US economy and US monetary policy. Kim and Roubini (2000)
use the same set of variables to study monetary policy in G7 countries.
6In doing do, we stick to applied work on monetary policy in the euro area that incorporates
money in its specification, in particular Georgiadis (2015), Barigozzi et al. (2014), Rafiq and
Mallick (2008), and Peersman (2004).
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Figure 2: Model Variables
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Notes: The data were retrieved from Macrobond, primary data sources are: European Money
Markets Institute (EONIA), Eurostat (GDP , Industrial Production), Hamburg Institute of In-
ternational Economics (PCOM), the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FFR) and the ECB
(HCPI, M1, EUR/USD).7
In our euro area data set, comprising monthly data over the period from 1999m1
to 2019m12, real output is measured in terms of real GDP .8 As economy-wide
price indicator we use the harmonized consumer price index (HCPI), since it is the
ECB’s explicit policy target and highly correlated with the GDP deflator. Com-
modity prices are measured by the overall commodity price index (PCOM) of the
Hamburg Institute of International Economics in Euro. The money stock M1 in-
cludes overnight deposits and cash. As short-term money market rate we use the
European OverNight Index Average (EONIA), defined as average of interest rates
on overnight unsecured lending between banks.
EONIA, FFR and EUR/USD are all measured at monthly averages. All
variables are in natural logs except for EONIA and FFR. Hence, our vector of
endogenous variables in Equ. (1) is of dimension 7× 1 and given by
yt ≡ (EONIAt, GDPt, HCPIt, PCOMt,M1t, FFRt, (EUR/USD)t)′.
7Note that the officially published time series of M1 exhibits a jump in May 2005, which is related
to the fact that Spanish non-MFI savings accounts were re-classified and included in M1 from
then on. We have eliminated this break by adding Spanish non-MFI savings accounts to M1 also
prior to May 2005.
8Monthly data are obtained through interpolation using industrial production data and the method
proposed by Chow and Lin (1971).
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The sample starts at 1999m1 with the formation of the euro area as a monetary
union and goes through 2019m12, which makes 252 observations. The time series
are presented in Figure 2.
Modeling US interest rate policy often stops in 2008, when the policy rate hit the
zero lower bound and was complemented by unconventional measures. In the euro
area such a lower bound has arguably not been reached during the sample period.
The deposit facility rate and EONIA became negative in 2014 and declined further
thereafter. Therefore, and in accordance with Hartmann and Smets (2018), we use
the full sample in the estimation.
3.2 Identification
Having uncovered a set of fifteen monetary policy shocks from high-frequency data in
Subsection 2.2, we now outline how we use this information to identify the following
structural VAR associated with the reduced form given by Equ. (1):
Byt = c
∗ +
L∑
i=1
A∗i yt−i +wt, (2)
where c∗ = Bc, A∗i = BAi, wt = But and wt ∼ N (0, I). The matrix B is the
structural parameter matrix that governs the instantaneous relationships between
the model variables. It is chosen such the following sign restrictions are satisfied:
wˆ1,t > 0, (3)
where wˆ1,t is the structural residual of the first equation of the SVAR in Equ. (2)
9
for t = 2002m11, 2003m03, 2008m11, 2008m12, 2009m03, 2009m04, 2011m10, and
2015m12, i.e., months of restrictive policy shocks, and
wˆ1,t < 0 (4)
for t = 2002m12, 2003m06, 2008m10, 2009m01, 2011m11, 2012m07, and 2014m09,
i.e., months of expansive policy shocks (see Table 1).
The sign restrictions given by Expression (3) and (4) are complemented by mag-
nitude restrictions to make sure that the identifying shocks are economically mean-
ingful. Specifically, we require that each of them exceeds (in absolute terms) half
the standard deviation of the series of structural residuals of the policy equation—
a choice that is motivated by computing time considerations. These additional
magnitude restrictions rule out that structural residuals of a negligible size are mis-
interpreted as policy shocks and sharpen our identification, but they are not crucial
for the results. Estimates based on sign restrictions only are provided in Appendix
A3.
9Without loss of generality we identify the monetary policy rule in the first equation of the SVAR.
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3.3 Estimation
The model is estimated with standard Bayesian techniques, employing an inde-
pendent Normal-Wishart prior with Minnesota-style shrinkage of the prior param-
eter variance-covariance matrix VA, where A = (c,A1, . . . ,AL) with dimension
K × (KL + 1) and VA assumed diagonal, implying independent parameters. With
regard to the K2L+K diagonal elements vii,A (i.e., the prior values of the variance),
we set a flat prior variance on intercepts, vii,A = 100, and decreasing prior variances
on lag parameters, vii,A = κ1 · l−2 for own lag l and vii,A = κ2 · l−2 · σˆ2ii/σˆ2jj for lags of
other variables, where the scaling parameter σˆ2ii/σˆ
2
jj is the ratio of estimated residual
variances of univariate AR(12) models for variables i and j. The hyperparameters
are set to κ1 = 0.1 and κ2 = 0.01 to achieve sufficient shrinkage, but the results are
robust to increasing these values and, hence, the prior variance, to, e.g., κ1 = 1 and
κ2 = 0.1.
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The prior mean of AR(1) parameters in the VAR is set to one, while all other
slope parameters, including the constant, are set to zero. Hence, the model estimates
are shrunk towards a multivariate random walk, which is a reasonable assumption
given the non-stationary nature of the variables at hand (see Figure 2); but the re-
sults are robust if we choose prior values smaller than one for the AR(1) parameters.
In selecting structural parameter matrices B that satisfy the sign and magnitude
restrictions we apply the well-established procedure proposed by Rubio-Ramı´rez
et al. (2010) for set-identified models.11 Specifically, we randomly draw a square
orthogonal matrix from a multivariate Normal distribution and multiply it with the
Cholesky factor of V to obtain independent shocks. If a candidate draw does not
satisfy the sign and magnitude restrictions on the structural residuals, it is discarded,
otherwise it is retained. We stop sampling when we have collected 5,000 valid draws.
4 Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks
In this section, we report the impulse responses of our model variables to a restric-
tive monetary shock. We compare them to those obtained using a traditional sign
restriction approach and explore the robustness of our results with respect to the
number of identifying monetary policy shocks.
4.1 Basic Results
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of our seven model variables to a restrictive
monetary policy shock over a 5-year period. It also plots the impulse response of
10We do not consider the diffuse prior V −1A = 0, because it is subject to overfitting due to the
relatively high number of parameters to be estimated. Our findings do not hinge on the use of
the Minnesota prior, however. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we apply the diffuse
prior and reduce the parameters to be estimated by lowering the lag length to, e.g., L = 4.
11See Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl (2017) for a textbook treatment.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses, 68% Credible Sets
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Red: Sign and magnitude restrictions on structural residuals. Gray: Sign restrictions on impulse
responses analogous to Uhlig (2005).
the forward discount premium (FDP ), which is implied by the results for EONIA,
the federal funds rate and the exchange rate.12
As baseline, we report posterior medians and 68% credible sets.13 Notice that
EONIA responds on impact to the monetary policy shock, i.e., within the same
month. This does not come as a surprise, given that our identification of monetary
policy shocks is related to interest rate expectations reflected in high frequency data
on overnight interest rate swaps. Hence, EONIA is a natural anchor for the scaling
of the shock and so we normalize the median impact response of it to 25 basis points.
A number of interesting results emerge, all of which are consistent with standard
macroeconomic theory. To begin with, there is a negative effect on output and
it intensifies gradually. The effect reaches its maximum after one and a half to
two years and then levels off. The effects on consumer prices are clearly on the
negative side on impact and they remain so in the medium-run. In contrast, while
commodity prices also respond negatively on impact, there is no systematic medium-
run effect. This suggests that the medium-run price effects of restrictive monetary
12Specifically, the impulse response (IR), calculated as IRFDP,k = IREUR/USD,0−IREUR/USD,k+∑k
t=0(IREONIA,t− IRFFR,t), measures the arbitrage gain from holding a short position in USD
and a long position in EUR while EONIA rises unexpectedly due to a monetary policy shock.
13Results for 100% credible sets based on posterior means of the reduced-form coefficients are
presented in Appendix A4.
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policy shocks materialize mainly through core inflation. The stock of narrow money
responds negatively on impact but the effect levels off in the medium-run.
Regarding the international value of the Euro we observe an appreciation fol-
lowing a restrictive shock, while the federal funds rate tends to fall initially. These
effects suggest that the demand for euro-denominated assets increases and that the
demand for dollar-denominated assets correspondingly decreases. Finally, the me-
dian response of the forward discount premium remains close to zero, suggesting
that the unexpected interest rate hike does not provide a notable arbitrage gain
from a long position in Euro and a short position in US-Dollar.
4.2 Comparison with Traditional Sign Restrictions
Kerssenfischer (2019) suggests that studies that find puzzling effects of US monetary
policy shocks do so because they miss important information in their empirical setup
rather than suffering from an invalid identification. In turn, one might ask, whether
our textbook results on euro area monetary policy are sample-driven rather than
identification-driven and whether we would achieve similar results when we apply a
conventional identification scheme.
Therefore, we compare our results with those obtained using traditional sign
restrictions on impulse responses in line with Uhlig (2005), which require consumer
prices and the money stock to move in the opposite direction of the short-term
interest rate over five consecutive months beyond impact.
First, notice that imposing these sign restrictions on top of the restrictions on the
structural residuals leaves our results virtually unchanged. This is not surprising: As
can be seen from Figure 3, the traditional sign restrictions—a negative co-movement
of EONIA with M1 and HCPI—are not binding for the posterior median and the
credible sets in the first five months. In other words, we obtain as an estimation
result what is imposed as an assumption by Uhlig (2005).
Second, the impact on unrestricted variables remains largely inconclusive with
the traditional sign restriction approach. Real output seems to not respond sys-
tematically on impact or even positively, echoing Uhlig’s original findings on US
monetary policy. This holds analogously for the federal funds rate. Also for com-
modity prices and the Euro-Dollar exchange rate, many draws indicate positive
responses.
We conclude that the clear findings on the effects of monetary policy are not
sample-driven. They rather result from the strength of the identification procedure
that we propose.
4.3 Number of Identifying Shocks
Our overall identification strategy builds on uncovering monetary shocks from high-
frequency data; these are defined as policy incidents that are surprising and of a
‘sizable magnitude’ (see Subsection 2.2). In our baseline scenario, a ‘sizable magni-
tude’ is understood as leading to an average change of the considered swap rates that
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exceeds 1.5 standard deviations. This definition leads to a set of fifteen monetary
policy shocks.
Figure 4: Impulse Responses, Alternative Numbers of Identifying Shocks
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Top left (5σ-scenario): 2008m10, 2008m11, 2011m10, and 2011m11. Top right (3σ-scenario): 5σ
plus 2002m11 and 2012m07. Bottom left (2.5σ-scenario): 3σ plus 2003m03, 2003m06, 2009m01,
and 2015m12. Bottom right (baseline specification): 2.5σ plus 2002m12, 2008m12, 2009m03,
2009m04, and 2014m09.
The rationale for the choice of a relatively large number of shocks in the baseline
scenario is that it essentially rules out the theoretical possibility of the coincidental
occurrence of other than monetary policy shocks with the same sign at the same
dates. In the following, we consider more stringent definitions of ‘sizable shocks’,
namely those where the average change of the considered swap rates exceeds two
and a half, three and five standard deviations. These alternative definitions, which
we refer to as 2.5σ-, 3σ-, and 5σ-scenario, lead to an identification of ten, six, and
four monetary policy shocks, respectively. The implied impulse responses are given
in the panels of Figure 4.
We find that the main qualitative results are already obtained when only the four
largest shocks—two restrictive (November 2008 and October 2011) and two expan-
sive (October 2008 and November 2011)—are used for identification (5σ-scenario,
top left panel of the figure): a significant response of output, consumer prices, com-
modity prices, the money stock and the exchange rate.
When the threshold is lowered to three standard deviations, two more shocks are
captured, a restrictive one in November 2002 and an expansive one in July 2012.
13
This improves identification further (top right panel of the figure). The shape of
the impulse responses are already very close to those of the baseline specification,
which are reproduced in the bottom right panel of the figure, while the credible sets
are wider.
Lowering the threshold further to 2.5 standard deviations provides four more
shocks. The corresponding impulse responses are shown in the bottom left panel
of Figure 4. They basically match those of the baseline specification both in shape
and width. We conclude that there is a minimum number of restrictions required to
achieve a strong identification, though this number appears to be reasonably small
to allow for enough flexibility of the model to fit the data.
5 Systematic Monetary Policy
Having analyzed the response of the economy (our key macroeconomic variables) to
unpredictable monetary policy decisions in Section 4, we now turn to the predictable
component of monetary policy and discuss the implied estimates of the ECB’s policy
rule. Moreover, we evaluate how the short-term interest rate would have evolved if
monetary policy had been set in a fully predictable way according to the estimated
policy rule.
5.1 Policy Rule Estimates
Assuming that the short-term interest rate is a suitable indicator for monetary
policy, which is standard since Bernanke and Blinder (1992), the structural VAR in
Equ. (2) provides a measure of systematic monetary policy, i.e., the responses of the
interest rate to changes in the other (macroeconomic) model variables.
Specifically, the contemporaneous (i.e., within-a-month) response of the interest
rate (EONIA) to model variable y, denoted as ϕy, can be recovered from the
structural parameters in Equ. (2) according to ϕy = −b1,y/b1,1, where b1,y and b1,1
are the contemporaneous structural parameters of variable y and EONIA in the
monetary policy equation.
Existing studies differ widely in their assumptions regarding the specification
of the policy rule, in particular on which variables enter the reaction function and
which parameters are set to zero. The triangular approach (recursive identification)
imposes—corresponding to monetary policy rules along the lines of Taylor (1993)—
that output and prices enter the policy rule and that the money stock does not (cf.,
e.g., Christiano et al., 1999). In recent work, using a non-recursive approach, Arias
et al. (2019) construct sign and zero restrictions on the contemporaneous parameters
ϕy based on the same assumptions.
However, traditional non-recursive identification schemes abstain from Taylor-
rule reasoning and instead focus on the information available to the monetary au-
thority within the same month (Leeper et al., 1996; Sims and Zha, 2006). This prac-
tically exchanges the sets of variables with and without zero restrictions, as output
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and consumer prices are published with delay, while the amount of outstanding cash
and overnight deposits is known on a daily basis.
This methodological difference pertains to other variables beyond output, prices
and money. Recursive identification of non-US monetary policy, for example, as-
sumes that the US (i.e., the foreign) interest rate is part of the reaction function,
while the exchange rate is not (Dallari and Ribba, 2020; Peersman, 2004). In con-
trast, in a non-recursive scheme, Kim and Roubini (2000) deploy the assumption that
the monetary authority responds to exchange rate fluctuations and that changes in
the foreign interest rate are not relevant beyond the extent to which they are caused
by exchange rate fluctuations.
Figure 5: Contemporaneous Monetary Policy Rule Coefficients, Baseline
Specification
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Our results on the policy rule are summarized by means of histograms in Figure
5, which show the estimated contemporaneous monetary policy rule coefficients.
According to these distributions, which cover the entire set of identified draws, real-
time data availability seems to play an important role for the conduct of monetary
policy. The majority of draws show that the ECB responds contemporaneously to
fluctuations of commodity prices, narrow money, the exchange rate and the federal
funds rate, all of which are available on a daily basis. Furthermore, the results are
consistent with standard theory: Interest rates are raised when commodity prices
surge, when narrow money growth accelerates, when the Euro depreciates against
the US-Dollar or when the US interest rate goes up.
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The ECB also appears to take the most recent development of output into account,
thereby acting counter-cyclically. In contrast, coefficients of the HCPI are dis-
tributed over a wide range of positive and negative values, which is a striking result,
since consumer price inflation is the ECB’s key target variable. This lack of a clear
response to contemporaneous consumer prices might therefore be due to publication
lags, since current information on consumer prices is not available at the time when
monetary policy is set.
With regard to existing approaches we conclude that real time data availability
is a crucial element in identifying systematic monetary policy. Furthermore, caution
is required if Taylor-rule inspired restrictions are applied to SVARs, as there seems
to be no monetary policy response to contemporaneous consumer prices—probably
because they are not observable in real time. However, this finding does not speak
against the use of Taylor rules per se, as they usually involve a richer specification
than the VAR framework, in particular future projections of (output and) prices.
5.2 Counterfactual Monetary Policy
We complete our empirical analysis by exploring how interest rates, in particular
EONIA, would have evolved over time if monetary policy had been set in a purely
systematic way according to the estimated policy rule. We construct a counterfactual
range of EONIA that excludes fluctuations due to monetary policy shocks (red area
in Figure 6) and compare it with the actual outcome (red line). Hence, the red area
can be interpreted as a target range for EONIA, if monetary policy had been set
in a fully predictable way according to our estimated policy rule.
Figure 6 also plots the three policy rates of the ECB, i.e., the main refinancing
rate, usually referred to as ‘the policy rate’ or the ‘key interest rate’, the marginal
lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate. EONIA followed the main re-
financing rate closely until October 2008, when the ECB changed its procedure of
providing liquidity to the banking system from a variable-rate bidding to a fixed-rate
full allotment procedure. This led to mounting excess liquidity and made EONIA
converge to the deposit facility rate (see the discussion of these measures in Ap-
pendix A2).
The interest rate hikes and cuts in the first three years of the monetary union
seem to be well in line with the estimated policy rule. In 2002, we observe that
monetary policy was relatively loose, which is in accordance with the assessment of
Hartmann and Smets (2018, p. 78).
In the following downturn, the ECB could have reduced the main refinancing rate
further and in the subsequent expansion, it could have raised rates more gradually.
Instead, it stopped the rate cut at 2%, but kept the main refinancing rate unchanged
for a relatively long period of time.
The following sequence of rate hikes, in turn, was swift. The policy rate and
EONIA moved from the lower (expansive) edge of the counterfactual range in late
2005 to the upper bound in mid-2007. Hence, at the dawn of the global financial
crisis, euro area monetary policy was particularly restrictive.
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Figure 6: Actual Interest Rates and Counterfactuals without Monetary Policy
Shocks
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Red line: Realized EONIA. Red area: Counterfactual EONIA (68% credible set). Gray area:
Corridor of standing facilities. Upper/middle/lower black line: Marginal lending facility/main
refinancing/deposit facility rate. Red bars: Dates of restrictive monetary policy shocks. Black
bars: Dates of expansive monetary policy shocks.
In July 2008, when the crisis was unfolding, the ECB raised its interest rates even
further. Hartmann and Smets (2018, p. 78) concluded that this did “not appear to
be justified by the ECB’s own outlook for growth and inflation”. Our model, instead,
suggests that the rate hike can be justified, as the upper and lower bound of the
counterfactual range shift upwards.14 But as the monetary policy stance had been
particularly restrictive for over a year and had not yet reacted to the unfolding crisis,
the interest rate hike in July 2008 seems provocative as it prolonged an extraordinary
restrictive policy stance.
During the global financial and economic crisis—a period of high economic and
policy uncertainty—several monetary policy shocks occurred (marked by vertical
bars in Figure 6). The deposit facility rate had become the new benchmark policy
rate and monetary policy was less restrictive than before the crisis.
In the first half of 2011, the ECB raised interest rates again and Hartmann and
Smets (2018, p. 79) argue that the “interest rate increases in 2011 do not show up
as a major policy mistake, but seem delayed as the inflation and growth projections
14The different assessment might result from the fact that Hartmann and Smets (2018) use real-
time forecasts to estimate the policy rule, while our assessment is based on current and past
observations.
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suggested an earlier tightening move.” We also do not find that the interest rate
hikes in 2011 moved policy towards a particularly restrictive stance, but rather that
it had been relatively loose before these rate hikes.
In the following years, interest rates lie well within the counterfactual range. In
particular, the decisions to cut interest rates to below zero were well in line with the
estimated policy rule. During the business cycle downturns in 2016 and 2019, the
negative rates could have been lowered even further.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we show that information on dates of a reasonably small number of
monetary policy shocks and their direction is sufficient for strong SVAR identifica-
tion. This requires identification of these shocks through outside information in a
first step, which can be obtained using a narrative approach as done in previous
studies, or—as we suggest—purely data-based, using high-frequency information
from financial markets. Whereas the present paper uses this approach to study the
ECB’s monetary policy, it is sufficiently general and flexible to be applicable in a
wide range of VAR settings.
The main advantage of this approach is its utmost agnostic nature. No theoret-
ical a-priori assumptions regarding any outcome (e.g., as through traditional sign
restriction on impulse responses) are required. External information is used only to
restrict the sign of the structural residuals at dates when significant shocks have oc-
curred. This also implies that policy shocks are identified properly by construction.
In our application to monthly euro area data over the period from 1999 to 2019,
we uncover fifteen significant interest rate surprises by the ECB. The implied results
regarding the effects of monetary policy shocks are all economically meaningful. The
domestic economy responds immediately to an unexpected interest rate decision in
many important dimensions. The clarity of the results pertains even if we allow for
the full set of identified draws or other alterations of the model. Another remarkable
result is that several qualitative findings are already obtained by using only the four
largest of the fifteen shocks. Intriguingly, we obtain as an outcome what traditional
sign restrictions impose as an assumption.
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A1 ECB Press Releases
A representative example of a press release of the ECB Governing Council, when
policy rates were kept unchanged, is from November 7, 2002 (emphasis added):
“At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the minimum
bid rate on the main refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain unchanged at 3.25%, 4.25% and
2.25% respectively.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these deci-
sions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. today.” (ECB Governing Council,
2002)
A representative example of a press release announcing interest rate changes is
from July 5, 2012:
“At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB took the following monetary
policy decisions:
1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be
decreased by 25 basis points to 0.75%, starting from the operation to be settled
on 11 July 2012.
2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 25 basis
points to 1.50%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 25 basis points to
0.00%, with effect from 11 July 2012.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these de-
cisions at a press conference starting at 2.30 p.m. CET today.” (ECB Governing
Council, 2012)
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A2 Narrative Accounts of Monetary Policy Shocks
in the Euro Area
In this Appendix we study the monetary policy shocks employed in the analysis
in more detail using ECB material and press articles. The eight months in which
the ECB surprised financial markets with an exceptionally restrictive interest rate
decision were November 2002, March 2003, November 2008, December 2008, March
2009, April 2009, October 2011, and December 2015. The seven months in which it
surprised with an exceptionally expansive interest rate decision were December 2002,
June 2003, October 2008, January 2009, November 2011, July 2012, and September
2014. Below we discuss these events in chronological order.
November 2002 (+)
At its meeting on November 7, 2002, the Governing Council decided to leave inter-
est rates unchanged. But this decision was not unanimous. President Duisenberg
declared at the press conference later that day (being put into writing in the ECB’s
Monthly Bulletin, ECB, 2002) that there was an extensive discussion, with several
members obviously arguing in favor of a rate cut. The economy was in a business
cycle downturn, but consumer price inflation was still elevated. The Economist
(2002a) commented that “the ECB’s stance is hard to understand. Partly it reflects
the ECB’s single-minded focus on inflation”.
What preceded this contentious interest rate decision? The main refinancing
rate stood at 3.25%. The last interest rate cut had been a year ago, in November
2001 following the New York terror attacks, which had aggravated the downturn
amid the burst of the stock market. In November 2002 the Fed had cut its policy
rate significantly by 50 basis points the day before the ECB Governing Council met
and many market participants expected it to follow the Fed.
But it didn’t. “Alan cuts, Wim refuses to follow”, commented The Economist
(2002a) in an allusion to the then chairman of the Fed, Alan Greenspan, and the
president of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg. This restrictive monetary policy decision
had a political-economic background. It can be interpreted as an attempt by the
still young central bank to demonstrate and thus consolidate its independence.
In the run-up of the meeting, politicians from Germany, France and other coun-
tries urged the bank to cut rates in order to support the economy. With respect to
these pleas, Ernst Welteke, president of the German Bundesbank and member of the
ECB Governing Council, said some days before the meeting: “In such a situation,
it is more difficult for us to reduce interest rates. The people and financial markets
would get the impression that we are giving in to political pressure” (Der Spiegel,
2002, translation by the authors).15
15While a substantial share of financial market participants did not expect interest rates to remain
unchanged, this does not mean that nobody expected it. In an article posted in the morning
of November 7, just before the meeting of the Governing Council, the Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung (2002) noted that “analysts had recently pointed out that the ECB would probably not
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December 2002 (−)
Two days before the meeting of the ECB Governing Council on December 5, 2002,
The Economist (2002b) conjectured that “boldness has not been one of the char-
acteristics of the European Central Bank. So few people expect the bank to throw
caution to the wind and announce a cut of half a percentage point in European
interest rates”.
This was all the more likely since “central bankers have proved resistant to outside
pressure before” (ibid.), which was an allusion to the previous interest rate decision
in November 2002. The ECB, however, relented in the face of slowing growth and
easing inflationary pressure and surprised markets once again by cutting rates by
50 basis points.
March 2003 (+)
In a speech at a G7 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in Paris
two weeks before the ECB Governing Council met on March 6, 2003, president
Duisenberg said that uncertainties had increased lately and that the perspective for
an economic recovery was no longer supported by the most recent data available
to the bank (The Guardian, 2003). Importantly, “this weaker outlook, as we see it,
should contribute to lower inflationary pressure. And as you know, price stability is
our aim”.
Many market participants interpreted this assessment, together with similar
statements of other members of the Governing Council, as evidence for a more
substantial rate cut, given that policy rates had been unchanged for two consecutive
months. “Why so small?”, The Economist (2003) and, according to the newspa-
per, many economists asked after the ECB announced its interest rate decision. To
them, the decrease of the main refinancing rate by only 25 basis points came as a
disappointment.
June 2003 (−)
At that time, a substantial interest rate cut was considered necessary by many
observers. But equally many remained skeptical about the ECB: “Even though
most forecasters had agreed that a 50 basis point cut was the best outcome, the
ECB’s record of extreme caution had led many to fear a different outcome”, the
BBC (2003) noted.
“But in the event, the smoke signals emanating from Frankfurt turned out to be
accurate” (ibid.): On June 5, 2003, interest rates were cut by 50 basis points, as
many had hoped but not believed.
be forced to take action and therefore the key rates would probably not change despite the Fed’s
decision. According to the experts, the desire expressed by politicians for lower interest rates and
the recent discussion about the EU Stability Pact will delay a rate cut in the euro area at least
until December” (translation by the authors). This was exactly what happened.
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Mid-2003 to mid-2008
The five years preceding the global financial crisis, from mid-2003 to mid-2008, were
a period of almost perfect monetary foresight. No significant policy shock occurred.
Each of the nine interest rate hikes, one in late 2005, five in 2006, two in 2007 and
another one in 2008, in the amount of 25 basis points each, were well anticipated in
timing and magnitude.
Especially for the last one in July 2008 this might seem surprising, with the
financial crisis already unfolding and economic growth losing momentum. In its
explanation of the interest rate decision, the ECB acknowledged a “weakening of
real GDP growth”, but at the same time saw inflation rates to “have continued to
rise significantly” and to “remain well above the level consistent with price stability
for a more protracted period than previously thought” (ECB, 2008a). So, worries
over price stability guided the ECB once again and markets anticipated the interest
rate hike accordingly.
October 2008 (−)
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 severely aggravated the crisis of
financial markets. Central banks all over the world took measures to counteract the
freezing of interbank lending. Nonetheless, the ECB left interest rates unchanged in
its regular meeting on October 2 (ECB Governing Council, 2008a).
Assuming that inflation would remain too high due to inflation-indexed wage-
setting (“nominal increases which are abnormal in our view”, ECB, 2008b), the
Governing Council stressed the crucial importance of keeping inflation expectations
firmly anchored. This was perceived restrictive by financial markets, the short-
term swap rates increased by up to 2.4 basis points. However, the Financial Times
(2008a) noted that “Mr. Trichet carefully left room for manoeuvre and did not rule
out possibly co-ordinating a cut in interest rates with the US Federal Reserve—if
consistent with combating inflation.”
This coordinated rate cut was orchestrated less than a week later. The monetary
policy committees of the main central banks in the world met on October 8 and col-
lectively cut policy rates by 50 basis points (ECB Governing Council, 2008b). This
surprised financial markets, given the ECB’s dogmatic position on price stability.
The Financial Times (2008b) cited the then Chief European Economist at Goldman
Sachs, Erik Nielson, who described as “breath-taking the U-turn in ECB thinking”.
The ECB might have “had little choice but to fall into line with action taken by
other central banks”.
While the magnitude of the rate cut from 4.25% to 3.75% was not extraordinary,
another measure, announced in a separate press release (ECB Governing Council,
2008c), enhanced the expansive shock: The procedure for providing liquidity to
the banking system was changed from a variable-rate bidding to a fixed-rate full
allotment procedure.
Excess liquidity started to build up for the first time in the bank’s history. The
net recourse to the deposit facility increased from a long-term average of almost zero
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to 155 bn. Euro in the second week of October, when the measure was announced
and implemented, and to 240 bn. Euro in the following week. The mounting excess
liquidity pushed EONIA from the middle of the policy rate corridor (i.e., from close
to the main refinancing rate) to the bottom (the deposit facility rate), making the
deposit facility rate the effective policy rate (Hartmann and Smets, 2018, p. 54).
In the same press release, the ECB announced that it would decrease the corridor
of standing facilities from 200 to 100 basis points, implying a re-increase of the
deposit rate by 50 basis points and, hence, to its previous level of 3.25%. This
means that the change of the allotment procedure constituted a policy rate cut of
50 basis points, from 3.75% (the main refinancing rate) to 3.25% (the deposit facility
rate).
Hence, the overall measures taken on October 8 amounted to a monetary easing
of 100 basis points, half of which is attributable to the collective rate cut and half to
the change in the allotment procedure. As a consequence, short-term swap rates fell
by up to 20 basis points, which far outweighed the restrictive decision of October 2.
Altogether, October 2008 was a month of significantly and unexpectedly expansive
monetary policy.
November 2008 (+)
Less than an hour before the ECB announced its interest rate decision on November
6, 2008, the Bank of England surprised financial markets by cutting the bank rate
from 4.50% to 3.00%. This amounted to the largest single rate cut since 1981, and
in turn placed high expectations on the ECB.
Many expected a cut of the main refinancing rate from 3.75% to at least 3.00%
because the British bank rate had never been lower than the main refinancing rate of
the ECB. Moreover, financial market turmoil was still broadening and intensifying,
while upside risks to price stability were alleviating.
But the disappointment followed swiftly: Although the Governing Council con-
sidered a 75 basis points cut in the debate (ECB, 2008c), rates were cut by only
50 basis points. Meanwhile, president Trichet urged others, especially the banking
sector, to help restore confidence.
December 2008 (+)
Again, the ECB appears to have been preempted by the interest rate decision of the
Bank of England. Although the Governing Council on December 4, 2008, decided
to cut interest rates by 75 basis points, this was less than the 100 basis points bank
rate cut by the BoE.
The Handelsblatt (2008) noted that “hopes of a 1.00 percentage point cut in the
key interest rate by the European Central Bank (ECB) drove the markets significantly
upwards [...] When the ECB cut the key interest rate by ‘only’ 0.75 percentage points,
this initially led to disappointment among investors” (translation by the authors).
The Financial Times (2008c) asserted that while “the ECB’s move was still the
biggest in its history [...] there had been hopes of even bigger reductions”.
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January 2009 (−)
The international press predominantly concluded that the monetary policy decision
of January 15, 2009, was too tentative. Referring to the cut of the main refinancing
rate by 50 basis points, The Economist (2009) assessed that “the ECB is not hurrying
to cut interest rates—mostly for the wrong reasons”. The Financial Times (2009a)
asserted that “the European Central Bank is not cutting rates fast enough” and that
“that, at least, is what markets believe. [...] Currency and bond markets are in a
tizzy about such relative inaction, worrying that the ECB is behind the curve”.
This was, however, not what markets believed. As described above, the change
from a flexible-rate bidding procedure to fixed-rate full allotment in October 2008
led to an immediate and substantial increase of excess liquidity, which made the
ECB’s corridor system, with short-term money market rates fluctuating around the
main refinancing rate, essentially a floor system, with market rates hovering just
above the deposit facility rate.
In the January meeting, the Governing Council not only decided to cut the main
refinancing rate by 50 basis points, but also to restore the width of the corridor of
standing facility rates from 100 to 200 basis points. This implied that the deposit
facility rate fell by another 50 basis points, from 2.00% to 1.00% overall.
This decrease, not the 50 basis points decrease of the main refinancing rate, was
the relevant rate cut and closely followed by EONIA. When the decisions came into
effect a week later, the Financial Times (2009b) re-assessed that “overnight market
rates moved sharply lower, as the full force of last week’s interest rate decision came
into effect”.
March 2009 (+)
Similar to November and December 2008, the Bank of England somewhat raised
expectations of the ECB that it did not meet. The bank rate was cut by 50 basis
points in February and another 50 basis points in March. The ECB paled in com-
parison, as it lowered its interest rates in March by only the same amount (50 basis
points), after it had not changed them in February.
“The Bank of England and the European Central Bank interest rate-setting com-
mittees both met on Thursday [March 5, 2009, A/N]. They face similar economic
crises but gave very different answers to the problems facing them. The UK central
bank is acting in proportion to the severity of the crisis. The eurozone’s monetary
authority is doing far too little”, the Financial Times (2009c) asserted.
April 2009 (+)
By that time, several central banks had reduced their policy rates to zero or almost
zero, while the deposit facility rate of the ECB was 0.50% and the main refinanc-
ing rate was 1.50%. “Many had expected the European Central Bank to slash its
main interest rate on Thursday and join the quantitative easing club”, the Financial
Times (2009d) noted. “A big cut is what markets had expected. Instead, the ECB
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trimmed its main rate by just 25 basis points to 1.25 per cent. The euro rose sharply
immediately afterwards, further squeezing the eurozone economy.”
The Handelsblatt (2009) suggested that the decision was motivated by the ECB’s
reluctance to adopt a zero-interest policy. “The decision to cut the key interest rate
by a quarter of a percentage point [...] delays the inevitable move to a zero-interest
policy. [...] For some time now, it has been clear to all market participants that the
ECB cannot maintain its reluctance to lower key rates” (translation by the authors).
October 2011 (+)
In April and July 2011 rates were raised due to rising inflation. According to Hart-
mann and Smets (2018) “the interest rate increases in 2011 do not show up as a
major policy mistake”.
But in October 2011, markets, amid a deteriorating business cycle outlook, pre-
dominantly expected a rate cut which did not materialize. This expectation was fed
by statements of Governing Council members. Yves Mersch from Luxemburg said
that rate cuts could be considered if the economic situation worsened considerably
more than expected (Reuters, 2011). Erkki Liikanen from Finland suggested that
the deterioration may have been already happening (ibid.).
However, consumer price inflation was still above 2% and it was Jean-Claude
Trichet’s last meeting as ECB president. Reversing the interest rate increases from
earlier that year could have been seen as an admission of a policy mistake. Hence,
the ECB surprised many financial market participants by keeping rates unchanged
at its meeting on October 6.
November 2011 (−)
Interest rates were not only kept unchanged in October 2011, outgoing president
Trichet also offered no indication that an interest rate move could be due in the near
future (CNN Money, 2011). Furthermore, there was no striking new assessment of
the economic situation: Inflation was at elevated levels, growth was very moderate
and subject to heightened downside risks.
Against this backdrop, the rate cut of 25 basis points announced after the meeting
on November 3, 2011, may be seen as a demonstration of the new president, Mario
Draghi, to follow a more accommodative policy than his predecessor. The Economist
(2011) wrote accordingly that “’Super Mario’ takes charge. [...] Jean-Claude Trichet
liked to prepare the ground for interest-rate changes by signalling them before they
were actually decided. [...] The decision came as a surprise to financial markets
partly because it departed from Mr Trichet’s way of doing things.”
July 2012 (−)
The surprising rate cut in November 2011 was followed by another cut in December
2011 which had been expected. Subsequently rates were kept unchanged until July
5, 2012.
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At this meeting, all three policy rates were cut by 25 basis points. According to the
press, the uniformity of these cuts surprised markets. “As expected, the ECB has
cut its main refinancing rate by 25 basis points to 0.75% and the marginal lending
facility (emergency funds) by 25 basis points to 1.50%. In a less expected move they
also cut the deposit rate to zero”, noted the Financial Times (2012) and concluded:
“It’s clear the ECB has gone into experimental mode.”
This mode shift not only surprised the press, but also financial markets. The
Handelsblatt (2012) quoted a money market trader in Frankfurt with the words:
“The reduction in the interest rate on the deposit facility comes as a complete sur-
prise to us. I am curious how the money market will deal with it. After all, many
had recommended that the ECB should not cut the interest rate to zero” (translation
by the authors).
September 2014 (−)
In line with forward guidance introduced in July 2013, the Governing Council in
August 2014 announced that interest rates would remain unchanged for an extended
period of time (ECB, 2014). Only a month later, at its meeting on September 4,
2014, it decided to cut interest rates by 10 basis points.
Moreover, in June of this year, when the deposit rate had been cut to below
zero for the first time, the ECB had indicated to have reached the lower bound.
“Speaking on that occasion, Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, said that ‘for all
practical purposes, we have reached the lower bound.’ [...] Today he insisted that
whatever he might have said in June the ECB had now definitely reached the lower
bound” (The Economist, 2014). He also conceded that the interest rate decision was
not unanimous.
December 2015 (+)
“Draghi has over promised and under delivered.” This quote, cited by BBC (2015),
sums up the situation on December 3, 2015. As consumer price inflation had re-
mained well below its target for several years, “Mario Draghi had sent strong signals
in recent weeks that he and his colleagues on the ECB’s governing council were pre-
pared to ‘do what we must to raise inflation as quickly as possible’ ” (The Guardian,
2015).
An investor, quoted by Handelsblatt (2015), suggested that “Draghi had de-
liberately raised expectations too high in order to exert pressure on the Governing
Council” (translation by the authors). The newspaper maintained that the views
in the Governing Council must have diverged considerably. In the end, “many in
the markets had been looking for a bigger reduction in the deposit rate” (Financial
Times, 2015) than from −0.20% to −0.30%.
The Wall Street Journal (2015) concluded that “the ECB’s moves were a major
disappointment from a central bank whose actions have typically exceeded investors’
expectations”—interestingly, a view that differs dramatically from the perception of
the ECB in the early years of its existence.
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A3 Results without Magnitude Restrictions
In the baseline specification, we impose magnitude restrictions on top of the sign
restrictions on structural residuals. In the following, we consider the results when
these magnitude restrictions are dropped and only sign restrictions are used for
identification.
Figure A1: Impulse Responses, No Magnitude Restrictions
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As can be seen from Figure A1, omitting magnitude restrictions hardly affects the
results. Our qualitiative findings are virtually identical, the only implication is that
the credible sets become wider. Hence, magnitude restrictions do not only ensure
that the identifying shocks are economically meaningful, they also sharpen inference,
which motivates their use in the baseline estimation.
ix
A4 Model versus Estimation Uncertainty
Baumeister and Hamilton (2020) put forth a fundamental objection to the use of
conventional credible sets in the case of set identification. Credible sets (or confi-
dence intervals) are means to highlight estimation uncertainty in a finite sample.
Estimation uncertainty can be reduced by increasing the sample size.
Set identification, however, entails another source of uncertainty, which is due
to the variety of models for which the identifying restrictions hold. This kind of
uncertainty is inherent to (and a benefit of) set identification. It cannot be altered
by increasing the sample size but only by changing the identifying assumptions. As
demonstrated by Baumeister and Hamilton (2020), the use of conventional credible
sets may exclude valid model specifications and, in the worst case, lead to spurious
results.
Figure A2: Impulse Responses, Full Model Variety
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Therefore, they propose to present the full set of identified draws—i.e., 100% credible
sets—based on the OLS estimates of the reduced-form coefficients, Aˆi and Vˆ . This
means to ignore estimation uncertainty and to solely but fully capture the amount
of model uncertainty. Figure A2 shows that the basic results remain intact when we
apply this concept to our case.16
16Instead of OLS estimates we use the posterior means of the reduced-form coefficients. The OLS
estimates are equivalent to the posterior means under the diffuse Normal-Wishart prior. For other
priors—like Minnesota, as in our case—using the posterior means is the proper generalization.
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